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Among the issues raised in the call for contributions to the symposium on ‘Climate
Justice – International Law in an Age of Catastrophe’, we find the question whether
‘international law as we know it [is] able at all to deliver solutions to the climate
crisis, or [whether] is it part of the problem’. ‘In other words’, the call for contributions
proceeds, ‘the question is whether the current crisis can be solved within our
current legal and economic system – or whether we need more fundamental
changes’ (emphases added). In this blogpost, I want to unpack, situate and
problematize some of the assumptions underlying these questions and signal
other ways of thinking and acting in the Anthropocene, which I assume is what the
symposium’s editors refer to as the ‘Age of Catastrophe’. Climate change, I will
argue, is neither a ‘crisis’ nor a problem that can be ‘solved’. I want to qualify it,
instead, as a condition or a ‘configuration of existence’ (Neyrat, at 183) in which
we ‘become-with’ climate change and ‘stay with the trouble’ it engenders. This
relates to the complexity, unpredictability and uncontrollability of both the causes
and the effects that living in a changing climate imply for human and more-than-
human life forms. To embrace these concerns on an ontological level – as defining
any form of being in the Anthropocene – implies moving beyond the modernist
mindset of ‘problem-solving’ the environmental ‘externalities’ of Western ways of life.
This requires a dismissal of cause-and-effect thinking that links the identification of
‘problems’ to particular ‘solutions’; the linear temporality that, based on past lessons,
identifies current issues that ought to be solved for a better predicted future; and
the anthropocentric interventionism where instrumental human reasoning is seen as
capable of mastering a ‘defiant Earth’ or unruly nature.
Drawing on eco-philosophy and critical international relations theories, I explore
alternative ways of envisaging and enacting climate justice in the Anthropocene.
Inspired by theoretical and methodological proposals on speculative realism and
object-oriented ontology, I conceive of climate change as a ‘hyperobject’ – an entity,
as coined by Morton, so massively distributed in space and time that it defies not
only our understanding but also our control. Fundamentally, the analysis does not
offer concrete legal solutions to the problem of climate change. It suggests, instead,
a set of sensibilities – or ways of sensing and relating to climate change – that are
productive to reenvisage legal approaches and political perspectives attuned to the
Anthropocene.
Representations of climate justice in international law
In international law, human rights discourse and institutions are commonly employed
to articulate concerns for climate justice. This framework takes into account inter-
and intra-generational considerations as well as historical responsibilities of states
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for greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. Yet, certain aspects of what climate change
is and what it implies evade the human rights law register, which presents important
limitations to enact climate justice in terms of actors, space and time. First, the liberal
victim/state binary characteristic of human rights law posits the human victim as
right holder and the state as duty bearer. Co-affected victims and co-responsible
duty bearers fit uncomfortably in this deontic framework. Second, the fixed territorial
coordinates that constrain the paradigm of state sovereignty under human rights
law do not account for the trans-territorial and non-static implications that states
and non-state actors’ GHG emissions have on victims under the effective control
of other states. Third, the backward-looking temporality of human rights litigation
hampers forward-looking and deep time thinking. Against this backdrop, calls for
climate justice have also been raised by scholars advocating the adoption of a
relational – rather than dichotomous – approach to human/nature interactions and
interconnexions. Through a prism of ‘coexistentialism’, this sensibility overturns the
human exceptionalism of human rights law. Seen from a relational perspective,
concerns for climate justice do not privilege human victims but enable politics of care
in a materially embedded and horizontal fashion. This relational approach repositions
the human in relationship to other life forms – human and non-human, material and
non-material, animate and inanimate. With Tsing, precarity thereby becomes an
‘earthwide condition’ (at 4), emphasizing the shared vulnerability of the entire living
order. In contrast to the strict causality demanded by a human rights law-based
approach to climate justice – a causality between climate-related harms and victims’
rights and between the victims and the state of jurisdiction – relational sensibilities
consider a much wider set of correlations of both a physical and empathic, direct and
indirect, near and distant nature. In short, this ontology evokes a greater sensitivity
to the interdependent reality we live in. In a world that continuously rips us apart from
each other, with unequal patterns of suffering and deferential vulnerabilities, climate
justice cannot be addressed by only thinking about the ‘self’ – or one’s own living
conditions and interests framed as ‘rights’ – in light of the actions or omissions of
one’s state of nationality or residence. Instead, we should aspire to be sensitive, to
viscerally sense the distress caused by climate change, whether the harm directly or
only indirectly impacts us as human being.
Sensing climate change – speculating the unknown
The turn to sensing is intricately related to the complexity of climate change and
the ‘necessity of contingency’ it calls for, which concerns not only what we can or
cannot know of the world and its future, but also the way in which people need to
conceive of their own life in a rapidly changing climate. ‘Hyperobjects’ like climate
change can never entirely be deployed nor described, let along controlled. No
legal regulation could ever capture the complexity of the ongoing event, but only
mitigate identified causes and adapt to its partial effects, while still having to cope
with the continuously emerging properties of the system. The ability to sense climate
change is thus always indirect and happens through the intermediary of its local
manifestations. Indeed, ‘[b]y definition it is almost impossible for changes in climate
to be perceived through individual experience’ (Bauer and Bhan, at 19). As lawyers,
this realization compels us to speculate about climate change’s causes and effects
beyond immediate human representation and experience. This is an invitation
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to engage creatively and imaginatively with ‘climate change’ in order to sense its
emerging effects, even if we cannot directly or entirely relate to those. In line with
Morton, a bewildering or ‘dark’ touch accompanies this ‘ecological awareness’: the
variety of temporal and spatial scales of climate change make us aware of how
interdependent everything is, yet equally aware that we can never know everything
that is happening, and that there is nowhere ‘safe’ to go to. As we are caught up
in this ‘mesh’ – which does by no means imply that ‘we’ have all equally taken part
in setting it up – there is no opting in or opting out, and no one can have a good
conscience or clean hands. Fundamentally, however, a potentially liberating force
transpires from this consciousness. As argued by Campbell et al., ‘[r]ather than
a negative, overwhelming challenge, it gives us what we call a bleak optimism,
characterized as organizing without hope [that we can return to the modern world
that has ended], because climate change has already happened’ (at 739). In line
with the turn to affirmative critique – a new variant of critique that emphasizes
affirmation as a critical tool with creative potential to incite emotional responses
in everyday registers – the awareness of living in modernist ruins is embraced,
rather than mourned, and triggers new and different ways of being, acting and doing
(onto)politics in the Anthropocene.
Legislating the unknowable – ‘becoming-with’ climate change
Applied to international law, this turn to sensing implies an abandonment of
modernist, managerial approaches to climate change, which employ ideals of strict
causality, certainty and predictability in a ‘unidirectional, progressive, controlled
movement towards a coherent strategic target presumed desirable’, as put by Head
(at 65). The complexity of climate change reduces the utility of practical reasoning
and the capacity to make judgments based on past experiences or transpose
lessons learned into a progressive, linear future. By defeating instrumental reasoning
and ideals of scientific closure, the complexity of climate change questions the
possibility of ‘solving’ it, which is far from implying that nothing should be done to
cope with it. It implies, however, that international legal norms and practices should
not solely be oriented towards a predicted future characterized by clearly defined
normative objectives and policy outcomes. This instrumental ‘planning mentality’ is
inherently self-defeating in a context where unpredictable effects of global warming,
which exact causes defy our understanding, become characteristic features of our
time. To ‘become-with’ climate change invites instead a (legal) sensibility attuned to
the radical complexity and contingency of living in a warming world. Yet, one could
argue that through open-ended, experimental and responsive practices attuned to
the Anthropocene, it is the viability of legal systems all together that is put at risk.
As stated by Ellis, this viability relates to the capacity of legal orders ‘to provide
a certain degree of stability, predictability, and order in society, creating “islands
of predictability” for actors seeking to project themselves [and their undertakings]
into uncertain and highly contingent futures’ (at 306). ‘If these projections are to
be taken as merely experimental’, she continues, ‘law’s function could become
impossible to achieve’ (at 309). It therefore, she notes, seems to be precisely
law’s function that has to be rethought in what I have described as a process of
‘becoming-with’ climate change. To realign our legal imaginaries to unprecedented
upheaval brought about by climate change and its (human) survival implications,
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rather than securing the interests of international law’s subjects according to present-
day objectives, this function should be reoriented towards ensuring care as an
ethical and political obligation to consider the more-than-human world we inhabit.
Life as we know it is already over – what remains open is determining a form of
coexistence unconstrained by present concepts, to rethink notions such as ‘here
versus there, person versus thing, individual versus group, conscious versus
unconscious, sentient versus nonsentient, life versus nonlife, part versus whole and
even existence versus nonexistence’ (Morton, at 32).
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